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ACCOMMODATING REPUBLICANISM
DAVID M. RASMUSSEN*
Presently, there is a debate raging between deontological and teleo-
logical theories of justice. No doubt, both Jtirgen Habermas and John
Rawls would want to see themselves on the deontological side of the cur-
rent debate. However, each accuses the other of a kind of latent Aristote-
lianism.' The source of that accusation is clearly to be found in both think-
ers' attempts to accommodate the critique of liberalism by republicanism.
In the following I want to turn to that portion of the 1995 debate between
Rawls and Habermas which focuses on the Ancients and the Modems in
order to clarify what is at stake in what I have called "accommodating
republicanism." Then I want to pose the question of the relationship of
deontological to teleological theories of justice to see what kind of re-
sponse Habermas might make to Rawls's characterization of him as a
"classical humanist" or what we have referred to as a latent Aristotelian.
Finally, in a curious way, law is at the center of this issue whether one
wants to see it in the form of Rawls's constitutionalism or Habermas's co-
originality thesis. Does Rawls's constitutionalism provide an alternative to
the co-originality thesis?
I. ANCIENTS VS. MODERNS
The battle between Rawls's interpretative constructivism and
Habermas's argumentative constructivism comes to the fore over Benja-
min Constant's idea that the liberties of the modems and the liberties of
the ancients should be nourished by the same root. Habermas argues
simply that private and public autonomy are co-original.' In his (Haber-
mas's) view, Rawls finds himself defending the quintessentially liberal
position of prejudicing the liberties of the modems, private rights, over
those of the ancients, political rights! This is the heart of the debate. How
* Professor of Philosophy, Boston College.
1. The term Aristotelianism may be questionable. I presume that is what Habermas means
when he associates Rawls with a classical theory that legitimates its theory of justice by assuming
the actuality of just institutions as he does in chapter two of Between Facts and Norms. See JORGEN
HABERMAS, BETwEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY 58 (william Rehg trans., 1996). Further, I assume that is what Rawls means when he
associates Habermas with classical humanism, which he does at the end of the debate. See infra note
2.
2. The debate consists of an article written by Habermas, with a reply by Rawls. See JUrgen
Habermas, Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political
Liberalism, 92 J. PHIL. 109 (1995); John Rawls, Reply to Habermas, 92 J. PHIL. 132 (1995).
3. See Rawls, supra note 2, at 156-57 & n.39.
4. See HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 104.
5. See Habermas, supra note 2, at 127.
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does one retain the basic framework of liberalism while at the same time
accommodating the republican critique? The republican critique says about
liberalism the very thing that Habermas is here saying about Rawls:
namely, that liberalism functions to justify private rights. But there is more
at stake. The question is, how does one realize justice as fairness while
assuring impartiality in a process that is eminently democratic? The notion
of reciprocity derived from the procedure of argumentation provides the
basis for Habermas's solution. At issue is the notion of intersubjectivity
and with it the claim that, echoing Hegel's critique of Kant, Rawls adopts a
position that is monological, a kind of liberal solipsism. Of course, the
Habermasian thesis, anticipated from the beginning, is that justice as fair-
ness can only be achieved through an adequate notion of reciprocity. In
turn, in accord with Habermas's argument, an adequate notion of reci-
procity can only be gained from the procedure of argumentation in which
the actors in the political process mutually recognize the claims and
counterclaims of one another. Here, we encounter the centrality of public
will-formation, read democratic procedure, which can be reconstructed
as a public and intersubjective process derived from the procedure of
argumentation. The emerging thesis, which is a reconstruction of the
intersubjective demands of discourse, postulates the assumption that pri-
vate right can only be derived from the process of public will-formation.
It follows from this that private and public autonomy are co-original. Or
to put it another way, rights follow from the process of recognition. The
consequence would be that rights are democratically grounded from the
outset.
The point of all this is the claim that for Rawls rights are not demo-
cratically grounded. According to Habermas, this claim follows from the
critique of the original position. The critique goes something like this: if
Rawls had accepted Habermas's second critique, the epistemic associa-
tion of the reasonable and the true with the consequence that consensus
and validity would be linked from the outset, then he would not have to
use the original position as a device of representation because he would
have found that "the moral point of view is already implicit in the socio-
ontological constitution of the public practice of argumentation."6 Fur-
ther, Rawls, would not have had to make the second step in the theory,
that is the step to overlapping consensus, because the public practice of
argumentation requires the "complex relations of mutual recognition that
participants in rational discourse 'must' accept (in the weak sense of
transcendental necessity)." In other words, if Rawls had built consensus
into the first stage of the theory, rather than adding it on in the second
stage, he would have escaped both the arbitrariness of the second stage
as well as the implicit monological perspective of the first stage. Instead,





which one derives a certain intersubjective necessity, intersubjectivity,
with its notion of reciprocity, which guarantees impartiality, is written
into the theory from the outset. In this sense, practical reason is actual-
ized through mutual recognition. The result: "we could say that precisely
those principles are valid which meet with uncoerced intersubjective
recognition under conditions of rational discourse."8 In other words, con-
sensus need not be an afterthought.
From Habermas's point of view, Rawls's distinction between the
private and the public, which underlies his distinction between the politi-
cal and the comprehensive, is not only unnecessary but leads to unde-
sired consequences particularly when one focuses on liberties and rights.
Not only, in Habermas's view, does this contradict his (Habermas's) co-
originality thesis, it also goes against the historical insight that the
"boundary" defining the relative spheres is always shifting as defined by
the basic shifts in political will-formation. In this view, Rawls would be
better off if he would subsume this distinction under that of "legal regu-
lation," which would in turn be determined by the democratic life of a
political community. In other words, given such a scenario, legal regula-
tion would determine the distinction between the public and private in a
democratic way in the sense that those under the law would be its own
authors. The reigning question would be: "Which rights must free and
equal persons mutually accord one another if they wish to regulate their
coexistence by the legitimate means of positive and coercive law?" If
one were to put the question that way it would follow that Rawls's char-
acterization of a private domain which contains the realm of the compre-
hensive as distinguished from a public realm which characterizes the
political would be less necessary than it would at first appear. Habermas
then would shift Rawls's distinction between the private and the public,
the comprehensive and the political, to the domain of the procedure of
legal regulation which would accord the right to "equal subjective liber-
ties" as well as the public autonomy of its citizens. In brief, legal proce-
dure presupposes the subjective autonomy of its citizens, what Rawls
would call the domain of private right. At the same time, legal procedure
in a democratic society cannot be legitimate without the public exercise
of democratic lawmaking. Private and public autonomy presuppose each
other. Hence, one would infer from the argument that Rawls should have
concentrated on the procedure of democratic lawmaking."
Rawls denies Habermas's characterization. Here Rawls's more inter-
pretative constructivism comes to the fore. Rawls contends that with care-
ful attention to the design of a constitution in relationship to the process of
8. Id.
9. Id. at 130.
10. Habermas believes: "Once the concept of law has been clarified in this way, it becomes
clear that the normative substance of basic liberal rights is already contained in the indispensable
medium for the legal institutionalization of the public use of reason of sovereign citizens." Id.
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govermuent, one can see that private autonomy is not pre-political." The
constitutional convention selects a constitution with its Bill of Rights
which "restricts majority legislation in how it may burden such basic lib-
erties as liberty of conscience and freedom of speech and thought."'2 To be
sure then, rights "trump" popular sovereignty, but only as popular sover-
eignty is expressed in the legislature inasmuch as those very rights are
derived from a democratic process. Hence, basic liberties are "incorporated
into the constitution and protected as constitutional rights on the basis of
citizens' deliberations and judgments over time."'" In other words, and this
is a distinctly American view, popular sovereignty is to be distinguished
from "parliamentary supremacy." Following Locke's dualist idea of a con-
stitutional democracy, a distinction is made between ordinary lawmaking
by a legislature and the "people's constituent power to form, ratify, and
amend a constitution."'" As a consequence a distinction is made between
"higher law of the people" and the "ordinary law of legislative bodies."'"
The example which illuminates Rawls' argument is a historical one. Fol-
lowing Bruce Ackerman,'6 Rawls cites the three significant innovations in
American constitutional history, the founding of the Constitution 1787-91,
Reconstruction, and the New Deal. Rawls observes that in these periods it
was the electorate which "confirmed or motivated the constitutional
changes that were proposed and finally accepted."' 7
Of course, Rawls's argument, derived from historical interpretation,
and not purely from argumentation, relies on the development of the con-
stitutional history of the United States. As such, Rawls argues this refer-
ence proves that justice as fairness is a political notion rather than a notion
derived from natural law.'8 As a consequence, "the liberties of the modems
do not impose the prior restrictions on the people's constituent will.""' But
does it prove something beyond reference to the constitutional history of
the United States? This is one way of asking the question. Another way
might be to ask if the question of the co-relation of the liberty of the an-
cients and the liberty of the modems, of private right and popular sover-
eignty, can be resolved independent of a constitutional history. In Rawls's
view it could be that "Habermas may have no objection to justice as fair-
ness but may reject the constitution to which he thinks it leads, and which I
think may secure both the ancient and modem liberties." Fair enough.
Rawls is willing to concede that, "He and I are not, however, debating the
11. See Rawls, supra note 2, at 155-56.
12. Id. at 157.
13. Id. at 157-58.
14. Id. at 158.
15. Id.
16. id. at 158 (citing BRUCE ACKERmAN, WETHE PEoPLE, VOLUME I: FOUNDATIONS (1991)).
17. Id.





justice of the United States constitution as it is; but whether justice as fair-
ness allows and is consistent with the popular sovereignty he cherishes."2'
However, Rawls is sensitive to the interpretation, and thus the critique,
that Habermas gives to liberalism. Hence, in support of his argument that
individual rights are not pre-political, and to some extent in support of his
own more interpretative view, he cites an argument which Habermas uses
against Charles Larmore. 2 Larmore has argued that one right has to pro-
ceed and constrain democratic will-formation, "No one should be forcibly
compelled to submit to norms whose validity cannot be made evident to
reason."' Habermas interprets this to mean the establishment of a pre-
political right against the state which is perceived under the category of
violence. Against this view, Habermas presents a two-stage model which
begins with the "horizontal sociation of citizens who recognizing one an-
other as equals, mutually accord rights to one another. Only then does one
advance to the constitutional taming of power presupposed with the me-
dium of law." 3 Rawls would view his own construction in a similar way.
Hence, he arrives at two conclusions. First, that Habermas's position is not
that different from his own. Second, that Habermas misses on his inter-
pretation of liberalism. At this point, Rawls has made no attempt to cri-
tique Habermas, but merely defends his position against the presumption
of a liberal bias for private rights. But clearly he doubts that Habermas's
construction as a theoretical construction, such as the co-originality thesis,
will grant the proper exercise of law and justice.' Equally, he doubts the
emphasis on the political in Habermas's emphasis on "the normative con-
tent of the mode of exercising political autonomy." He speculates that the
origin of that idea is found in classical humanism (he must mean Aristotle)
where the greatest good is conceived of as participating in political life.
This notion is really derived from a comprehensive doctrine, a notion of
the good, which may be admirable and noble, but certainly not applicable,
in Rawls's view, to everybody. I take him to mean here that not everybody
is interested in the pursuit of the good, defined as politics or political ac-
tion. Private interests and pursuits are legitimate as well. In any case, from
the point of view of political liberalism, it would be inappropriate to assert
21. Id.
22. Charles Larmore, however, generally shares the view of political liberalism with John
Rawls.
23. HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 456 (quoting Charles Larmore, Die Wurzeln Radikaler De-
mokratie [The Roots of Democratic Reason], DELrrSCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FUR PHILOSOPH1E 41 (1993)).
24. HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 457.
25. Rawls is rather adamant on this point arguing that "for there is no human institution--
political or social, judicial or ecclesiastical---that can guarantee that legitimate (or just) laws are
always enacted and just rights always respected." Rawls, supra note 2, at 166. Further:
No special doctrine of the co-originality and equal weight of the two forms of autonomy
is needed to explain this fact. It is hard to believe that all major liberal and civic republi-
can writers did not understand this. It bears on the age-old question of how best to unite
power with law to achieve justice.
26. Id. at 169.
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one comprehensive view over others. Hence, for Rawls, not everybody
need pursue the good as in the politics of old.
II. THE TELEOLOGICAL QUESTION
Rawls has made a very interesting point to which, to my knowledge,
Habermas has yet to reply. His critique can be formulated in the following
way: if one asserts the co-originality thesis in the way that Habermas does,
with its implicit assumption about the primacy of the political in the classi-
cal, as opposed to the modem sense, then one buys into a teleology which
can only be justified through a comprehensive philosophical framework.'
Of course, Rawls has not responded to Habermas's characterization of him
as an Aristotelian in the second chapter of Between Facts and Norms.'
However, it would be interesting to read Habermas's response to this very
illuminating critique which suggests Habermas has gone too far in his at-
tempt to accommodate the claims of republicanism. Equally, it would be
interesting to know if Habermas believes that Rawls, by relying on Ameri-
can constitutionalism, avoids a similar dilemma-namely, the assertion of
the teleological primacy of the public good on comprehensive grounds.
Rawls claims to get by his interpretive constructivism what he contends
Habermas does not get by , his (Habermas's) argumentative
constructivism." As I understand it, Rawls claims to be able to assert a
merely political and non-comprehensive notion of democratic procedure
through his identification with the claims of a certain form of constitu-
tional legal theory. Hence, Rawls could claim a more or less intersubjec-
tivist identification with Habermas's co-originality thesis, but on grounds
that require a relatively weak notion of reason. Although Habermas has
spoken recently about the distinction between the reasonable and the true
in Rawls," to my knowledge he has not addressed the issue of Rawls's
constitutionalism.
27. See id. (critiquing Habermas's view of the co-originality thesis).
28. See HABERMAS, supra note 1, at 56-66 (critiquing Rawls).
29. See Rawls, supra note 2, at 132.
30. See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY
75-101 (1998).
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